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Abstract 
 
We draw on rational crime theory to help analyse 55 articles that have been 
retracted from 734 peer-reviewed journals in the field of economics. We highlight 
and discuss what these findings indicate regarding the nature and pattern of 
research malpractice in that discipline. Particular attention is given to exploring “no 
reason” retractions and the policy guidelines of publishers regarding retracted 
papers. We conclude that the frequent vagueness of retraction statements, and a 
reluctance to signal research malpractice, generally results in little damage to the 
reputation of caught, and known, offenders. Thus, a key deterrent to engaging in 
research malpractice is lacking. To reduce the incidence of research malpractice, 
we offer several recommendations for publishers and journal editors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Growing concern about the substantial scale of research misconduct (Martin, 
2013) has pointed to the need for additional empirical evidence regarding 
questionable research practices (henceforth, QRPs) in all disciplines. Biagioli and 
Kenney (2016, p.1944), for example, have called for more information regarding 
forms of “traditional misconduct – fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism 
…[and]… new misconduct … fake peer reviews and citation rings.” 
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There is clear evidence that academic economists engage in QRPs (Necker, 
2014; Wible, 2016). Studies by Karabag and Berggren (2012; 2016) have 
analysed QRPs in 6 and 43 retracted papers in economics, respectively. However, 
knowledge of the frequency, nature and pattern of research malpractice within the 
discipline remains rudimentary. To address this, we analyse 55 articles that have 
been retracted from 734 peer-reviewed journals in economics. This is the largest 
evidential base of retractions analysed to date in peer-reviewed studies in the 
field of economics. Nonetheless, the results should be regarded as indicative, 
rather than exhaustive. They draw attention to problems of poor research 
practice in the field.  
As Fanelli (2013, p.1) has argued, it is likely that the statistics obtained in 
studies of the type we conduct “are proportional not to the prevalence of 
misconduct but to the efficiency of the system that detects it.” Given the secretive 
and often shameful nature of research malpractice, a complete picture of its 
prevalence seems unlikely to be obtained. Therefore, we do not suggest that an 
increasing level of retractions can be equated with an actual rise in research 
malpractice. Rather, increased retractions seem likely to be caused by increased 
vigilance on the part of editors, publishers, reviewers and readers. Mindful of 
these caveats, we contend that the data analysed here offer valuable insight to 
the forms of malpractice that occur, even if its full extent is not fully documented. 
Our analysis also raises important issues about the high incidence of “no reason” 
retractions in economics journals. 
We make three important contributions. First, we highlight the forms of 
malpractice that drive retractions in peer-reviewed journals in economics. In doing 
so, indicative data regarding the frequency and nature of research malpractice in 
the discipline are provided. We also explore the incentives that prompt (allegedly) 
“rational” researchers to use QRPs. This leads us to suggest ways of eliminating 
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those incentives in order to improve the integrity of research. Second, we 
recommend some actions that publishers and journal editors should take to deal 
more effectively with research malpractice. The associated discussion highlights 
the incidence of “no reason” retractions, reviews publisher guidelines on 
retraction, and proposes ways of reducing the frequency with which journals 
retract papers without stating a clear reason. Third, we propose a global protocol 
for dealing with retracted papers. 
We illuminate the incentives for research malpractice with a view to 
identifying possible remedies. We conclude that the vagueness of retraction 
statements, and a general reluctance to signal research malpractice, often results 
in little damage to the reputation of known offenders. Thus, a key deterrent to 
partaking in research malpractice is lacking. Moreover, deterrents are 
constrained by the limited resources applied to detection. For example, it is not 
sufficient to rely on the goodwill and discretionary time of editors and reviewers 
to assess academic research content. The incentive structures that influence 
journal editors are generally unhelpful. Editors are likely to be concerned that any 
signalling of research malpractice will damage the reputation of their journals. 
Thus, some editors may be less likely to offer clear signals regarding the 
prospect that QRPs appear in papers they publish.  
The present exploration of research malpractice in economics analyses articles 
retracted from economics journals ranked in journal lists issued by the U.K.’s 
Chartered Association of Business Schools (ABS) and the Australian Business 
Deans’ Council (ABDC). Both of these lists are used widely beyond the UK and 
Australia, particularly in countries where formal assessments of research quality 
occur. Despite much criticism that ranking lists distort research by prioritising 
the status of individual journals above the content of the articles they publish 
(e.g. Tourish and Willmott, 2015), these lists are much favoured by university 
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managements because of their convenience and auditability.  
We begin by reviewing existing evidence of research malpractice in economics, 
before describing the research methods we employ. Then we present findings, 
discuss how retracted papers are dealt with by journals, and highlight the need to 
examine the corpus of publications of authors who have had papers retracted. To 
improve current practices in respect of retracted papers, we conclude by offering 
some recommendations to editors and publishers. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Here we review studies of cost/benefit incentives in the context of research 
malpractice, before clarifying the meaning of “research malpractice” and then 
reviewing prior studies of research malpractice in economics. 
Our analysis of researcher engagement in QRPs is informed by traditional 
economic behaviour theory. This assumes that individuals will seek to maximise 
their private gain whenever they can. In particular, we follow an “economics of 
rational crime” framework, drawn from Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1974, 1996). 
Becker (1968) theorized that there were parallels between how people respond to 
opportunities for criminal activity and how they behave in a normal commodity 
market. Thus, in invoking an “economics of rational crime” framework, we 
consider the behavioural relations that exist between perpetrators of crime, 
victims of crime, and those attempting to stop crime.  
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1974, 1996) have contended that the decisions of a 
potential criminal follow a rational economic choice: that is, a rational individual 
will weigh the perceived benefits of a decision to commit a crime against the 
perceived costs of doing so. The cost to an individual of committing a crime 
includes the resources used evading apprehension, the punishment if convicted, 
the probability of being apprehended, the foregone wages, and the taste (or 
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distaste) for crime (which includes the impact on an individual’s moral values, 
predisposition towards crime, and risk preferences) (Ehrlich, 1996). The costs are 
greater when the punishment and the chances of apprehension are higher, when 
the costs of avoiding detection are higher, when an individual has a higher moral 
objection to crime, and when an individual is more risk adverse. Becker (1993, p. 
5) enters the caveat that although “many people (are) constrained by moral and 
ethical considerations… police and jails would be unnecessary if such attitudes 
always prevailed.” Calculation, he argues, is built into criminally-oriented 
decisions.  
Consistent with this theoretical lens, obvious benefits are obtainable from 
research malpractice, including relief from the time and costs involved in data 
collection and analysis. Beyond that, Craig et al. (2014) highlight how a culture of 
routinely subjecting research outputs to performance audit has taken hold in 
universities, especially those which are determined to improve ranking positions in 
(inter)national league tables. One consequence of this is that academics are under 
more pressure than ever to publish in reputable journals. They are rewarded by 
universities through career progression and salary increases if they do so, but are 
often penalised if they do not (e.g., by being moved to teaching only contracts) 
(McNay, 2016).  
Offsetting the benefits of engaging in malpractice are the costs of doing so. 
These can be imputed as a combination of the probability of detection, the likely 
severity of punishment, and the perceived reputational damage to the perpetrator. 
Such theorising leads to a conclusion that the likelihood of a researcher engaging in 
QRP’s is reduced by any increase in the probability of detection, and in the penalty 
(including reputational damage) if detected (Wible, 2003; Collins et al., 2007). In line 
with this, a recent review of rational choice perspectives on crime by Pogarsky et al. 
(2017, pp. 85-86) concluded that:  
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The results of longitudinal studies of panel data have revealed that offending is 
negatively related to the perceived certainty of punishment… and perceptions of 
sanction certainly are responsive to whether an actor has been punished for 
past offending experiences… Moreover, the results of randomized experiments 
have shown that rule breaking is reducible by clearly communicating an elevated 
risk of punishment to potential offenders (italics applied). 
   
In addition, we should be mindful of research findings revealing that ethical 
dispositions can be overwhelmed by the situations and opportunities people face, to 
the point that they also sometimes overcome the fear of detection and sanction 
(Clarke and Cornish, 1985). 
If rational academic economists consider that the benefits accruing from 
engaging in research malpractice outweigh the likely costs, at least some of them 
are likely to be tempted to engage in research malpractice (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). 
Lacetera and Zirulia (2011) have argued that the chances of being detected are 
small because of the unobserved nature of some of the practices involved (e.g., 
fabrication of data or the gifting of authorship). They contend also that research 
malpractice is likely to be widespread and hard to detect in research fields (such as 
economics) where incremental advances are provided, and, where there is low or non-
existent scrutiny of the authenticity of research data. Thus, there is ample 
encouragement for a rational researcher in economics to engage in research 
malpractice (Misangyi et al., 2008; Pillay and Kluvers, 2014). 
In many fields (including economics) the cost of engaging in research fraud is 
lowered by the reluctance of social science journals to publish replication studies.1 
Replications hold strong prospect of confirming the strength of a field or 
illustrating problems within it. Yet, many researchers report grave difficulty in 
publishing replications, particularly in journals where the replicated studies 
                                           
1 For example, in psychology, Martin and Clarke (2017) report that only 3 per cent of journals accept 
replication studies and that one third actively discourage them. 
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originally appeared (French, 2012). The infrequency of replication allows poorly 
supported or errant findings to remain undetected (Madden et al., 1995; Eden 
2002; Stroebe et al., 2012; Ioannidis, 2012; Bakker et al., 2012; Denison et al., 
2014). This encourages those who are contemplating engaging in research 
malpractice to actually do so.  
In accord with such a view, Hoover (2006) argued that it is rational for an 
author to engage in malpractice, given current incentives and problems of detection. 
For example, a plagiarist might be emboldened by knowing that the sole 
responsibility for exposing a plagiarist falls to an original author or whistle-blower, 
rather than an impartial sanctioning body. There are likely to be high financial and 
emotional costs borne by an individual in exposing a plagiarist. This paper 
promotes discussion of how the processes of detection, deterrence and retraction 
can be improved. 
 
What Constitutes Research Malpractice? 
 
Research malpractice includes fabrication (invention of data); falsification 
(inaccurate presentation of research, including omission of inconvenient results); 
plagiarism (inaccurate or unattributed use of someone else’s work) (Banks et al. 
2016; Lewis et al., 2011); self-plagiarism (recycling portions of an author’s own 
previous work without acknowledgment) (Bruton, 2014); and financial misconduct 
(non-disclosure of financial interests in research and misuse of research funds) 
(Hiney, 2015). These are well-known practices. However, two further less well-
known practices are p-hacking and HARKing (Hypothesizing After the Results are 
Known). 
P-hacking involves such actions as reporting only studies that deliver the 
desired p-value; terminating a study when a desired p-value has been reached; and 
dropping items from survey instruments that prevent attainment of ‘desirable’ p-
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values (Simmons et al., 2011; John et al., 2012; Academy of Medical Sciences, 2015). 
P-hacking also includes simply changing reported p-levels so that they suddenly 
become “significant” (Burns and Ioannidis. 2016). A study of approximately 250 
retractions in psychology found errors with p-values in 10% of papers, of which 
90% favoured the authors’ interpretations (Bakker and Wicherts, 2011). This 
supports the view that many retractions attributed to errors in data analysis are 
likely to have their origins in p-hacking or the outright invention of data.  
Chambers (2017) describes p-hacking as “the sin of hidden flexibility” because 
how researchers actually analyse their data is deliberately reported selectively or 
kept secret from editors, reviewers and ultimately readers. This conduct often 
involves a form of “data torture” in which the data are interrogated mercilessly until 
they support a given hypothesis. Such an approach risks saturating the literature 
with false positives, known as Type 1 errors (Starbuck, 2016), and “undead 
theories” that are used widely, but which are nevertheless unsound (Ferguson and 
Heene, 2012). 
HARKing involves presenting hypotheses as if they were developed a priori rather 
than ex-post. (For an example in economics, see 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440760100077X). HARKing 
is claimed to exaggerate the predictive power of theories under study, improve 
researchers’ prospects of obtaining statistically significant results, lead to “the 
adoption of theories and practices that are assumed erroneously to have obtained 
solid scientific support,” and make “the methods sections of many papers works of 
creative fiction rather than rigorous accounts of how (and in what sequence) 
research was conducted” (Authors, 20XX. See also Schwab and Starbuck, 2016; 
Garud, 2015). 
 
Studies of Research Malpractice in Economics 
 
Table 1 summarises eight studies published between 1986 and 2016 that have 
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explored the incidence of QRPs in economics. The table reveals high levels of self-
admitted QRPs by academic economists: for example, Necker’s (2014) survey of 631 
European economists found that 24% reported self-plagiarising and 32% reported 
presenting empirical findings selectively to confirm an argument. These data 
suggest that the existing level of retractions in economics understate the actual 
level of malpractice. 
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Table 1 
Studies of Questionable Research Practices in Economics 
 
        QRP  Authors Data Source Results  
QRPs 
generally 
Enders & Hoover 2004 127 editors of economics journals 70% are unlikely to report a case of plagiarism 
 Karabag & Berggren 
2012 
EBSCO Business Source Premier, 
Emerald, JSTOR, Science Direct journals 
6 articles retracted between 2008-2012 in economics journals that 
lacked a QRP policy or failed to screen for QRPs 
 Karabag & Berggren 
2016 
 
Necker 2014 
 
EBSCO Business Source Premier, 
Emerald, JSTOR, Science Direct journals 
 
631 European economists 
 
43 articles retracted in economics journals between 2005 and 2015 
 
 
94% had engaged in at least one QRP 
 
 
 Yalcintas & Selcuk 
2015 
107 US and European economics 
departments 
69% did not offer research ethics training to junior researchers 
 
Data Fraud 
List et al. 2001 134 US economists 4% had falsified research data 
 Necker 2014 631 European economists 3% had fabricated some data 
 
Plagiarism 
Enders & Hoover 2004 127 editors of economics journals 
24% had experienced plagiarism. An average of 42 plagiarism cases were 
reported per year 
 
Enders & Hoover 2006 
1208 US economists 24% reported having been plagiarised 
 Necker 2014 631 European economists 2% had copied from others without citing 
Self- 
plagiarism 
List et al. 2001 134 US economists 7–10% self-plagiarised or were guest/ghost authors 
 Necker 2014 631 European economists 24% self-reported they had self-plagiarised 
P-hacking 
Necker 2014 631 European economists 
32% had presented empirical findings selectively to confirm an 
argument 
HARKing* Necker 2014 631 European economists 79% reported engaging in HARKing 
Guest 
authors 
Necker 2014 
List et al. 2001 
631 European economists 
134 US economists 
3% had accepted or offered gifts for authorship 
7-10% self-plagiarised or were guest/ghost authors 
Poor 
research 
records 
 
Dewald et al. 1986 
 
154 US authors of economics articles 
 
15% of data sets were accurately recorded and properly documented 
* HARKing = Hypothesising After the Results are Known 
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QRPs in economics arise despite many leading journals in the discipline stating 
explicitly that they adopt the guidelines of the Committee on Publication Ethics 
(COPE).2 Other leading journals in economics comply with COPE guidelines 
(although this is unstated) in a form of implicit adoption. The “Retraction 
Guidelines” published by COPE are quite clear. They advise that retraction notices 
should state “who is retracting the article”; “the reason(s) for retraction (to 
distinguish misconduct from honest error)”; and should avoid “potentially 
defamatory or libellous” statements.3 COPE also advises that “the main purpose of 
retractions is to correct the literature and ensure its integrity rather than punish 
authors who misbehave” 
(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2802086/).  
Nevertheless, editors seem to be wary of making retractions. The Retraction 
Watch website (http://retractionwatch.com/) has documented many cases of 
authors taking legal action to prevent retraction of their papers.4 The prospect of 
a disgruntled author suing a journal editor or publisher seems to partly explain 
the high incidence, reported below, of “no reason” retractions and the general lack 
of transparency in other retraction notices. The vulnerability of editors to 
litigation diminishes the prospect of exposing all erring authors. 
 
                                           
2 Those making such a statement include The RAND Journal of Economics and The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics. 
 
3 The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) has similar policies. The ICMJE 
states that “The text of the retraction should explain why the article is being retracted and include a 
complete citation reference to that article.” See 
http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/publishing-and-editorial-issues/scientific 
misconduct-expressions-of-concern-and-retraction.html. 
 
4 For a current case (not in economics) see http://retractionwatch.com/2017/05/03/researcher-
sued-prevent-retractions-now-12/ 
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3. Method 
Our research questions are: 
1. What is the current level of retractions in the field of economics? 
2. What are the main reasons given for retractions? 
3. How clear are retraction statements and how useful are they for the field? 
To address these issues, we analysed 55 articles that have been retracted from 
734 peer-reviewed journals in economics. These 734 journals comprised the 316 
economics journals listed in the field “ECON” [that is, “Economics, Econometrics 
and Statistics”] in the ABS academic journal guide (hereafter, ABS Guide) published 
in 2015 (accessible at https://charteredabs.org/academic-journal-guide-2015/); 
and 418 additional journals classified as “Economics” in the ABDC’s journal list 
published in 2016 (http://www.abdc.edu.au/master-journal-list.php). The ABS 
Guide rates journals according to quality from 4* (highest) to 1. Combining both 
sources (converting ABDC rankings to the ABS ranking system)5 yields a journal 
list comprising 26 journals ranked 4* or 4; 94 ranked 3; 226 ranked 2; and 388 
ranked 1. We do not explore hundreds of other non-listed journals, such as “pay 
for publication” journals and/or “predatory” journals with weak or non-existent 
review processes.6 Nor do we explore other modes of research dissemination in 
economics (such as book chapters, conference proceedings, and working papers).  
Using Google Scholar, we searched serially for the terms “retraction”, 
“retracted”, “withdrawn”, and “withdrawal” in each of the 734 economics journals of 
                                           
5 An ADBC quality rating of A*, A, B, C is converted to an ABS quality rating of 4,3,2,1 respectively. 
 
6 We do not include journals whose publisher has “economic(s)” in their title and which appeared in 
Beall’s List of Predatory Publishers (updated to 23 January, 2017). These publishers include the Asian 
Economic and Social Society, The Economics and Social Development Organization, International 
Academy of Business and Economics, and the International Economics Development and Research 
Center. 
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interest. This yielded 74 retracted (or withdrawn) journal articles. We excised 19 of 
these articles because they had not been retracted for engaging in QRPs (five were 
retracted for unspecified reasons but were subsequently re-published; eleven were 
retracted because of “accidental duplication” of the article in the same journal; and 
three were retracted because of an “administrative error,” such as publishing a 
rejected article by mistake. Thus, we were left with 55 articles that had been 
retracted from economics journals for engaging in QRPs.  
To cross-validate this database, we repeated our Google Scholar search for 
retractions using three other sources: the Web of Science database from Thomson 
(https://apps.webofknowledge.com); a database of retractions made available by 
Retraction Watch (http://retractiondatabase.org/RetractionSearch.aspx); and the 
list of articles identified on the Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) plagiarism 
and research fraud website (https://plagiarism.repec.org/offenders.html). No 
additional retracted papers in the 734 economics journals of interest were 
identified.  
We examined statements announcing a retraction to identify the reason for 
retraction. We identified the journals associated with “no reason” retractions and 
reviewed the retraction policy guidance provided by their publishers. 
Appendix A contains a compendium of key details of the 55 retracted papers 
identified. This compendium should be a valuable resource in exposing flawed 
research and avoiding its propagation. The data provided for each retracted paper 
include year retracted, year published, author(s), abridged title, journal, ranking, 
citations, and reason for retraction. The quality of the retracting journal is 
expressed in terms of Journal Impact Factor (JIF), quartile position in the Scimago 
Journal Rankings List, and (equivalent) ranking in the ABS Guide.  
There are two ways in which our database under-reports the level of research 
malpractice. First, some articles known to contain malpractice have been retracted 
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or otherwise compromised, but have not necessarily been watermarked as such on 
the journal’s webpage, and are difficult to identify. To our knowledge, there is no 
single exhaustive database from which to identify an article (including those in 
economics) as being compromised. This problem arises because of the failure of 
some journals to disclose the fact of retraction clearly. Second, the incidence of 
retraction contains an inherent bias. Search methods using Google Scholar depend 
on the Internet searchability of journal databases. This searchability was neither 
reliable nor extensive until about 2007, when the database of journals published on 
Science Direct became searchable using Google Scholar. This seems to account for 
why the preponderance of identified retractions occurred during or after 2007. 
However, by 2010, Google Scholar covered 98-100% of academic journals from eight 
key databases (ACS, Emerald, ERIC, JSTOR, Oxford University, Project MUSE, 
SpringerLink, and University of Chicago) (Chen, 2010).  
 
4. Results 
 
Profile of Retracted Papers 
 
Table 2 summarises the 55 retracted articles in terms of time taken to retract, 
number of citations, and journal quality. 
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Table 2 
Profile of Retracted Papers in Economics 
 
Time to 
Retract 
Citations ABS/AJG 
Ranking 
Scimago 
Quartile 
Journal Impact 
Factor 
Years n Range n Rank n Quartile n Factor n 
< 1 35 0 - 10 42 4* 1 Q1 11 0 - 0.99 39 
2 6 11 - 20 9 4 1 Q2 41 1 – 1.99 8 
3 11 21 - 30 2 3 12 Q3 1 2 – 2.99 2 
4 0 31 - 40 0 2 38 Q4 1 3 – 3.99 1 
5 2 41 - 50 0 1 3 Not known 1 4 – 4.99 0 
6 to 9 1 51 - 100 2     > 5 0 
≥10 0 > 100 0     Not Known  
 
5 
Total 55  55  55  55  55 
 
 
With one exception, all articles were retracted between 2001 and 2016. The majority 
(64%) were retracted within a year of publication. In terms of influence, 26 retracted 
articles had informed further research, as evidenced by a collective 377 citations 
(according to Google Scholar). The remaining 29 retracted papers had no citations. 
However, this does not necessarily mean they had no effect on scholarly thinking: 
academics will have spent time studying them, even if they eventually concluded 
that they did not merit citation. Fourteen retracted articles were published by 
journals ranked as 3 or above in the ABS Guide. Most retractions appeared in 
journals ranked as 2 (n=38). The article with the most citations (81) was retracted 
in 2014 for plagiarism from Economic Modelling, seven years after publication.  
The highest ranked journal to retract a paper was the American Economic 
Review [AER] (rated 4* in the ABS Guide). An article by Kunce et al. (2002) in AER 
was retracted in 2007 by the second and third authors, Gerking and Morgan (see 
AER, 97(3), p. 1032). These authors apologised because their data did not support 
the main premise of their article 
(https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.97.3.1032). The original article 
remains accessible in the AER 
(https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282802762024656) and is not 
identified as retracted on the AER webpage or anywhere in the document. 
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Disconcertingly, seven articles involving research malpractice (plagiarism) 
documented by RePEc have not been retracted and remain available for scholars to 
access. The websites of the journals involved indicate no concern about the 
malpractice.7 This is surprising given the prominence of these journals in their 
field, shown here in parentheses as (ABS/ABDC/Scimago) indicates: Applied 
Economics (2/B/Q2), Economic Modelling (2/A/Q2), Energy Economics (3/A*/Q1), 
Journal of Air Transport Management (-/-/Q2), Journal of Applied Statistics (-/-/Q3), 
and Kyklos (3/A/Q2). 
Two questions arise. What was the rate of retraction in economics? How does 
that rate compare with the rate experienced in other disciplines? Based on the 
calculation method described in footnote 8, we estimate the approximate rate of 
retractions from journals in the field of economics as 1 per 10,000 articles 
published (that is, a rate of about 0.01%).8 This rate does not include articles that 
have been retracted for administrative reasons. Rather, it represents retractions for 
research malpractice (or “unknown reasons”). Precise calculation of retraction rates 
and comparisons of them across, and within, disciplines is an exercise fraught with 
difficulty. Caution should be exercised in reading purported retraction rates to 
ensure “comparing like for like”. Quite often the calculation of individual retraction 
rates is based on differing methods and underlying assumptions, and is affected by 
                                           
7 These articles are Barros (2008), Barros and Peypoch (2008), Barros et al. (2011), Bassem (2014), 
Ramos (2001), Fernando and Ramos (1999), and Gottinger (1996). 
 
8 Thomson Reuters InCite lists the number of citable articles published each year. Data are available 
from this source for 46% of our 734 journals. Over the period 2001 to 2016, the number of 
established journals increased from 540 in 2001 to 734 journals in 2016. We calculate the average 
citable articles per journal per year from the InCite data and then estimate the total citable articles 
each year for the all of the journals for which InCite does not provide data. Based on this approach, we 
estimate there were 529,278 articles published between 2001 and 2016. During this period we 
identify 54 articles retracted from these journals. This represents a retraction rate of of about 0.01% 
(54/529,278) or 1 in 10,000. 
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double counting, omissions and other errors. 
With these caveats in mind, we report that in science generally, “over the past 
decade, retraction notices for published papers have increased from 0.001% [that 
is, 1 in 100,000] of the total to only about 0.02% [2 in 10,000]” (Van Noorden, 
2011). Günther (2016), drawing on Sanders (2016), reported that the retraction 
rate in journals available on the PubMed database has increased steadily in recent 
decades, and that the rate was about 3.9 per 10,000 articles published in 2007. 
With respect to PsycINFO database journals, Günther (2016) reported a retraction 
rate of about 3.6 per 10,000 articles in 2011. Collectively, these data are 
disturbing. However, the most pressing concern should not be for the relativity of 
published retraction rates, but with focusing remediation efforts on reducing the 
incidence of questionable research practices.  
In accord with rational crime theory, the deterrent effect of reputational damage 
to researchers for committing research malpractice is weakened by the inability to 
reliably identify retracted papers and to disclose reasons for retraction. 
Furthermore, failure to clearly watermark a retracted paper as having been 
retracted, or to remove it from a journal’s website, may lead other researchers to 
inadvertently continue to be influenced by its content, and continue to cite it. For 
example, an article published in Economic Modelling 
(https://plagiarism.repec.org/bassem.html) is cited at least 10 times in peer 
reviewed journals (found using Google Scholar). Despite concerns over plagiarism, and 
an apology for such from the author (see the preceding website link), the article 
continues to be available.9  
                                           
9 The article is cited in the following journals: Social Indicators Research (2016), Quality & Quantity 
twice 2016), Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management (2016), Economic Analysis and 
Policy (2016), South African Journal of Science (2016), International Journal of Business and 
Management (2015), Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services (2015), Management (2015), Iranian 
Journal of Economic Studies (2013). 
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Disclosure of Reasons for Retraction 
 
Table 3 presents a summary of the reasons for retraction. Fake peer review was the 
major reason for retraction. This occurred in 12 cases, all associated with Khalid 
Zaman.10 He co-authored 12 retracted articles in economics (all in Economic 
Modelling). These articles had 19 co-authors and 105 citations. Each retraction 
notice states that: 
… the Editor was misled into accepting this article based upon the positive advice 
of at least one faked reviewer report … submitted from a fictitious email account 
which was provided to the Editor by the corresponding author during the 
submission ... (for an example, see Economic Modelling 45, 2015, p. 288). 
 
The retraction statements identify Zaman as the culprit but exonerate his co- 
authors.  
By early February 2017, Zaman had co-authored at least 213 published 
articles, 19 of which had been retracted. This unusually high rate of publication for 
an assistant professor should have signalled that questionable short cuts had been 
taken in the research process. To date, the retractions of papers co-authored by 
Zaman represent only about 9% of his voluminous output. The extent to which the 
problems that prompted the existing retractions continue to be present in Zaman’s 
other published papers is open to speculation. There is no reason to assume that all 
his remaining papers are free of similar blemishes. Without a full investigation of 
Zaman’s output, it is likely that defective work by him will continue to be cited, and 
inappropriately influence other research.  
                                                                                                                                   
 
10 Zaman was dismissed from his post as assistant professor in the Department of Management 
Sciences, CONSATS Institute of Information Technology, Abbottabad, Pakistan on January 23, 2015 
“on account of his involvement in fraudulent publications.” 
(http://ww3.comsats.edu.pk/ciitblogs/BlogsDetailsOuter.aspx?ArticleId=41879). 
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The ICMJE is quite clear on what to do with the corpus of published work of 
retracted authors: 
The validity of previous work by the author of a fraudulent paper cannot be 
assumed. Editors may ask the author’s institution to assure them of the validity 
of other work published in their journals, or they may retract it. If this is not 
done, editors may choose to publish an announcement expressing concern that 
the validity of previously published work is uncertain. 
(http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/publishing-and-editorial-
issues/scientific- misconduct-expressions-of-concern-and-retraction.html) 
 
In terms of rational crime theory, Zaman’s actions suggest that the deterrents in 
place to curb QRPs (such as the reputational damage arising from published 
retraction notifications combined with the probability of being apprehended) were 
considered sufficiently low compared to the benefits of committing research fraud. 
Table 3 
Reasons for Article Retraction 
Reason n % 
No reason 28 51 
No reason, at editor’s request 3  
No reason, at author’s request 2  
No reason, “author and/or editor” 23  
Fake peer review 12 22 
Plagiarism 7 13 
Self-plagiarism 4 7 
Flawed reasoning/analysis/conclusions 2 4 
Multiple submission 2 4 
Total 55 100 
 
 
Disturbingly, 28 of the 55 retraction notices (in 18 separate journals) did not 
provide a reason for retraction. Of these, the highest frequency of “no reason” 
retraction occurred in Statistics and Probability Letters (n = 8) and the International 
Review of Law and Economics (n = 3), both published by Elsevier. In respect of 23 of 
these 28 retracted papers, it is unclear who instigated the retraction (editor alone, 
author alone, editor and author in concert). There is no further explanation 
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provided, as the following example demonstrates: 
This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author(s) and/or editor. 
The Publisher apologizes for any inconvenience this may cause. (Journal of 
Economics and Business. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014861951500051X). 
 
In business and management, p-hacking and other QRPs are strongly 
implicated in retractions, although these are often ascribed to problems with data 
analysis (Author, 20XX). Thus, many such retractions make it clear that p-values 
have been reported incorrectly or inappropriate statistical tests have been used. 
However, allegations of malpractice are generally avoided, since (conveniently) the 
original raw data are usually reported by the authors to be unavailable for further 
analysis. It is unlikely that the field of economics would be completely free of 
problems arising from p-hacking. The extent of the problem is masked by the large 
number of retractions that offer no reason. 
Providing an ambiguous or vague retraction notice diminishes the deterrence of 
research malpractice by lowering the cost to the researcher of engaging in QRPs. 
Although some people might infer malpractice by the author, s/he has the option of 
plausible denial. It means that those who are guilty of research fraud may be able 
to continue academic work, retain papers in circulation that should justly be 
investigated, and continue to publish (possibly) fraudulent or defective work in peer 
reviewed journals. 
The 28 “no reason” retractions within a year of publication had generated 46 
citations on Google Scholar. With one exception, all “no reason” retractions were 
from a journal published by Elsevier. In general, the level of observed “no reason” 
retractions (51%) is high in comparison to the level reported in business and 
management. In the latter discipline area, 10% of retraction notices gave “no 
reason” or “vague reasons” – such as simply stating there were “errors” in data 
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analysis, but without explaining what these were (Author 20XX). The much higher 
rate of “no reason” retraction in economics may be due to the editors of economics 
journals being “more rational” and less willing to risk legal action from aggrieved 
authors.  
The high volume of retractions from journals published by Elsevier is not 
reflected in the size of Elsevier’s market share – at least as that share is proxied by 
the proportion of total economics journals it publishes that are represented in the 
ABS Guide and ABDC list (see Table 4). Whilst Elsevier’s market share is only 9.5%, 
it was responsible for 84% of the 55 retracted papers.11 Elsevier’s strong presence in 
our database of retracted articles may be attributable to its high level of proficiency 
in detecting QRPs; to it having more conscientious readers; and/or to the 
economics journals published by Elsevier being more prestigious, and thereby, 
attracting a high volume of papers containing QRPs. 
  
                                           
11 The overrepresentation of Elsevier contrasts with the situation reported by Author (20XX) for 
Business and Management. There, Elsevier published only about 20% of all retracted papers,with a 
more pronounced spread among other academic publishers (e.g., Taylor and Francis, SAGE, 
Springer). The leading publisher of retracted papers was a scholarly academy, the American 
Accounting Association. This was largely because a particularly prolific fraudster, James Hunton, an 
accounting professor, has had 37 papers retracted (http://retractionwatch.com/category/by-
author/james-hunton/). 
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Table 4 
Economics Journals by Publisher 
 
Publisher n % 
Springer 93 12.7 
Wiley 85 11.6 
Elsevier 70 9.5 
Tayor & Francis 60 8.2 
De Gruyter 20 2.7 
Oxford University Press 20 2.7 
Sage 19 2.6 
Cambridge University Press 18 2.4 
Emerald 14 1.9 
InderScience 13 1.8 
Others: < 1% share each 322 43.9 
Total 734 100  
 
We explored whether the publishers named in Table 4 committed themselves to 
stating clear reasons for retracting an article. Clear policies on retraction, and 
rigorous enforcement of those policies, would increase the penalties for research 
malpractice. This would thereby reduce the incentive to engage in such conduct. 
Table 5 reports the results of this further exploration.  
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Table 5 
 Publisher Policies on Stating Reasons for Retraction 
 
Publisher Source Policy on reasons for 
retraction 
Best Practice 
Guidelines Cited with 
Approbation 
Springer http://resource-
cms.springer.com/springer-
cms/rest/v1/content/19862/dat
a/v1/Pubslishing+Ethics+Guide+f
or+Editors 
States clearly the need to 
comply with COPE “Retraction 
Guidelines.” These advise that 
retractions should “state the 
reason(s) for retraction (to 
distinguish misconduct from 
honest error).” 
COPE 
Wiley https://authorservices.wiley.com
/asset/photos/Best-Practice-
Guidelines-on-Publishing-Ethics-
2ed.pdf 
 
The retraction notice “should 
enable the reader to identify and 
understand why the article is 
being retracted, or should 
explain the editor’s concerns 
about the contents of the 
article.” 
COPE and ICMJE 
Elsevier https://www.elsevier.com/about/
our-business/policies/article-
withdrawal 
 
No clear statement. ICMJE and National 
Library of Medicine. The 
latter states it “does not 
differentiate between 
articles that are 
retracted because of 
honest error and those 
that are retracted 
because of scientific 
misconduct or 
plagiarism.” 
Taylor and 
Francis 
http://authorservices.taylorandfr
ancis.com/custom/uploads/2016
/01/Author-services-correction-
policy.pdf 
 
“The rationale for a retraction 
will be given in a Statement of 
Retraction.” 
 
De Gruyter http://degruyteropen.com/you/jo
urnal-author/editorial-
policies/other-stm/ 
 
“A Retraction Note detailing the 
reason for retraction will be 
linked to the original article.” 
COPE 
OUP https://academic.oup.com/journ
als/pages/authors/ethics 
 
No clear statement. COPE and ICMJE 
Sage https://au.sagepub.com/en-
gb/oce/manuscript-submission-
guidelines%20#PublicationEthics 
 
No clear statement. COPE and ICMJE 
CUP https://www.cambridge.org/core
/about/ethical-standards 
 
No clear statement. COPE and ICMJE 
Emerald http://www.emeraldgrouppublish
ing.com/authors/writing/withdra
wal.htm 
and 
https://www.ifla.org/publications
/iflaipa-joint-statement-on-
retraction-or-removal-of-journal-
articles-from-the-web 
 
Adheres to the principles 
outlined in the International 
Federation of Library 
Associations/International 
Publishers’ Association, A Joint 
Statement on "Retraction or 
Removal of Journal articles from 
the Web". 
U.S. National Library of 
Medicine guidelines at 
https://www.nlm.nih.go
v/pubs/factsheets/erra
ta.html 
Inder 
science 
http://www.inderscience.com/pa
pers/policies.php 
 
No accessible statement  
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Most publishers stated no clear commitment to identifying explicit reasons 
for retraction. This means that no reasons, vague reasons, or euphemisms are 
provided — if any are provided at all. Yet several publishers refer with approbation 
to the COPE and ICMJE guidelines. These require a statement of the reasons for 
retraction. But our analysis points to this rarely occurring. For example, Wiley 
cites the COPE and ICMJE guidelines and states that a retraction notice “should 
enable the reader to identify and understand why the article is being retracted, or 
should explain the editor’s concerns about the contents of the article.” 
Nonetheless, it includes a diluting rider that ‘‘The COPE guidelines have no legal 
force and it is generally prudent to avoid ‘naming and shaming’ authors and 
simply to confirm a retraction, when necessary, in neutral and concise terms.” 
This stance seems inconsistent with the COPE (and ICMJE) guidelines, both of 
which advise that clear reasons should be given for retraction.  
The lack of clarity regarding reason for retraction opens the possibility that 
some retractions arising from fabrication and falsification are attributed instead to 
“errors.” Such an outcome will spare the feelings of the authors involved, but 
reduce the disincentives to engage in malpractice by ensuring that perpetrators 
can continue with their research careers. Note that the National Library of Medicine 
(NLM) policy (cited approvingly by Elsevier) allows the practice of not 
differentiating “between articles that are retracted because of honest error and 
those that are retracted because of scientific misconduct or plagiarism.” Overall, 
the publishers’ policy statements are insufficiently rigorous, often ambiguous, and 
frequently unclear about what actions to take in response to serious research-
related offences. 
 
Remedies 
 
Endeavours to reduce the level of research malpractice in published research 
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should seek to reduce the benefits obtained from doing so, and increase the likely 
costs involved, consistent with rational crime theory. This could include the 
ambitious task of persuading universities to be less preoccupied with their ranking 
in various national and international league tables; to be less intense in their hyper-
drives to “improve” research performance; and to commit to support a moratorium 
on awarding bonuses to academics for publishing in ( what are perceived to be) 
top journals (Chapman and Lindner, 2016). We contend that while current priorities 
prevail, the problems discussed will intensify. In terms of costs, increasing the 
certainty of enforcement and the associated fine (or punishment) will at least help 
deter some offenders. It would also ensure that fewer offenders are able to continue 
publishing problematic research in peer reviewed journals. 
Publishers’ own commercial interests and their publicly stated commitments to 
“ethicality in publishing” should prompt stronger action on their part. The growing 
awareness of malpractice diminishes public confidence in the integrity of research. 
Publishers share in the problems this causes, since if the view that something is 
seriously awry gains momentum, more questions will be asked about how 
publishers contribute positively to the publication process. At present, publishers 
can claim to be safeguarding quality by providing robust editorial support, and by 
eliminating poor work from journals. If that claim erodes, so does much of their 
unique selling point. People may become more insistent in asking whether the 
traditional model of journal publication has outlived its usefulness. On the other 
hand, if publishers are seen to take robust action against malpractice then they will 
put themselves in a stronger position to show that they add value. Below, with a 
view to improving the current situation,  we make four specific proposals that are 
directed mainly at publishing houses and journal editors. 
Proposal 1 
 
The publishing house responsible for the journal from which a paper is retracted for 
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research malpractice (henceforth the “retracting publishing house”) should be 
required to collate an inventory of all journal articles and other scholarly works 
published by the retracted author. The retracting publishing house should then 
formally advise other publishing houses responsible for publishing the works 
identified in this inventory (henceforth the “affected publishing houses”) of the 
retraction. The affected publishing houses will have a duty to inform their relevant 
journal editors of the details of the retraction. They should require their editors to 
audit any paper they have approved for publication by the retracted author, with a 
view to identifying any research impropriety. Pending the completion of such an 
audit, the paper(s) under scrutiny should be flagged on the title page, within the 
bounds of legal etiquette, with a clear warning to readers of the possibility of 
impropriety. Affected publishing houses should also be required to inform the 
corresponding author of all papers which cite the retracted paper, of the paper’s 
retraction.  
Proposal 2 
 
All journals should be required to issue clear statements of the reasons for 
retraction, in accord with recommendations of COPE and ICMJE (referred to 
earlier). If this is not done, then journal home pages should remove any explicit 
statement or implicit suggestion of compliance with COPE and ICMJE (or similar) 
guidelines regarding ethical publishing. Simply stating who instigated a request 
for retraction is not helpful to the wider scholarly community. Such statements 
obscure the extent of malpractice and limit the possibility of others learning from 
errors that have occurred. 
Proposal 3 
 
The text of a retracted paper should be clearly watermarkled as retracted. 
Otherwise, defective work will continue to be cited and influence scholarly 
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thinking.12 All retracting publishing houses should ensure they remove the text of 
all retracted papers from journal web sites and other databases and search 
engines. 
Proposal 4 
Publishing houses should require authors to supply de-identified raw data with all 
submissions. We understand the proprietary attitude of many academics to “their” 
data. However, we believe that researchers have a greater obligation to demonstrate 
ethical research practices by lodging data in a way that facilitates inspection, re-
analysis and replication. This would act as a bulwark against the perpetration of 
data fraud, or poor analysis, and enable journals to give clearer justifications for 
retractions. It means that poor statistical analysis or unjustifiable forms of p-
hacking would be identified and dealt with more easily. The burden of proof 
regarding data authenticity and data analysis needs to shift from those with 
questions, to those who produce the results (Clark, 2017). Some journals now do 
what we suggest. We argue that it should become common practice.  
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We have highlighted the paucity of information provided about the reasons for 
retracting articles from peer-reviewed journals in economics. The work of 
Retraction Watch, RePEc, and the authors cited in Table 1, go some way to 
redressing the balance. Our results strongly suggest the need for economics 
journals to be much more explicit about the reasons for retraction. Two benefits 
would flow from this. First, there would be a much clearer indication of the level of 
retraction for unacceptable research practices, including data fraud, plagiarism 
                                           
12 For example, Bar-Ilan and Halevi (2017) studied fifteen papers retracted in 2014 that had been 
cited 267 times between January 2015 and March 2016. They found that 83% of these citations were 
positive. 
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and self-plagiarism. Second, it would be much clearer to researchers in economics 
that engaging in research malpractice will harm their careers. This would increase 
the threat of reputational damage (a key attribute to deterring research 
malpractice in a rational crime framework) and reduce the influence of such 
articles in further research. 
The issues raised above are of fundamental importance. There is growing 
concern whether State funding for universities is money spent wisely and ethically 
(Goodstein, 2010). Each instance of unethical behaviour damages public trust in 
academic research at a time when such trust is vitally important. Yet, the reward 
and incentive systems within academia seem perversely designed to encourage 
poor practice (Harris, 2017). This points to the likelihood that the problems 
discussed will remain, and possibly intensify. Nonetheless, there needs to be 
greater awareness of QRPs and their harmful effects. Action by multiple 
stakeholders is required to increase the costs and reduce the benefits of these 
practices.  
The proposals made here are intended to stimulate debate and to prompt the 
academic community to move forward on these crucial issues. One way this could 
occur would be to investigate, and to model, the incentives that influence journal 
editors to not publish specific reasons for retraction.13 
                                           
13 We are indebted to a reviewer for this suggestion. 
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Appendix 
Retracted Articles from Economics Journals 
(arranged by year of retraction with some contractions to shorten “reason for retraction”) 
[Key: AJG = CABS Academic Journal Guide ranking; Anal. = Analysis; Econ. = Economic(s); Fin. = Finance; Int. = International; JIF = Journal Impact Factor; J. = Journal of; 
Prob. = Probability; SQ = Scimago Quartile; Stats. = Statistics; Rev. = Review; N = the journal does not have an impact factor, or is not listed by Scimago] 
 Year 
retracted
/ Year 
published 
Author(s)  Abridged title Journal AJG/JIF/SQ / 
Citations 
Reason for retraction 
  
1 
2016/15 Goorha Sequencing ideas into 
innovations through 
pure thought 
Econ. Letters 3/0.5/Q2/1 Plagiarism: “This article has been retracted at the request of the author 
following disclosure that data and text in the article had been copied from: 
Ivashchenko and Novikov (2006) Model of the Hierarchy of Needs, Automation 
and Remote Control, 67(9), 1512–1517” 
2 
2016/15 Rosenbaum Sensitivity analysis for 
average treatment 
effects in matched 
observational studies 
Biometrika 4/1.4/Q1/0 No Reason: "This article has been retracted on the request of the author." 
3 
2016/16 Meinzer Social mobility in the 
early middle ages 
Explorations 
in Econ. 
History 
3/N/Q1/0 No Reason: "The publisher regrets that this article has been temporarily 
removed. A replacement will appear as soon as possible in which the reason for 
removal … will be specified, or the article will be reinstated.” 
4 
2015/15 Page, Scott-
Clayton 
Improving college 
access in the United 
States 
Econ. of 
Education 
Rev. 
2/0.97/Q1/0 No Reason: Cites the regret notice immediately above. The article was not 
reinstated but published under a similar title in 2016. No reason for removal has 
been found. 
5 
2015/15 Hagendorff  Governance & risk in 
banking 
J. Econ. & 
Business 
1/N/Q2/0 No Reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author(s) 
and/or editor." 
6 
2015/15 Benoit Virtue of impatience 
when trading split 
orders  
Quarterly 
Rev. Econ. & 
Fin. 
2/N/Q2/0 As immediately above. 
7 
2015/15 Zientara, 
Kujawski 
Polish employees’ 
intentions to migrate  
Int. Econ. & 
Econ. Policy 
2/N/Q4/0 Self-plagiarism: "Upon request of the authors, this article is retracted because 
of substantial overlap with content published in [the title and authors of a 
journal article in the Polish language is provided]. 
8 
2015/15 Ortmann Experimental turn in 
Econ.  
J. Econ. 
Psychology 
3/1.23/Q1/0 No reason: “This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author(s) 
and/or editor.” 
9 
2015/13 Wang How ICT penetration 
influences Productivity 
Growth 
Econ. Dev. 
Quarterly 
2/0.83/Q2/0 Self-plagiarism: "The author requested the article be withdrawn after 
publication on Online First but prior to publication in the February 2015 issue, 
informing the journal that the paper included the original dataset and excerpts 
from an earlier draft of the paper co-written by the author and colleagues.” 
10 
2015/13 Zaman, Khilji Relationship between 
growth & poverty in 
forecasting framework 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/4 Fake peer review: "... the Editor was misled into accepting this article based 
upon the positive advice of at least one faked reviewer report … submitted from a 
fictitious email account … provided to the Editor by the corresponding author ... 
Dr Zaman wishes to admit sole responsibility and to state that his co-authors 
were not aware of his actions." 
35  
11 
2015/13 Bashir, Xu, 
Zaman, 
Akhmat, 
Ikram  
Impact of foreign 
political instability on 
Chinese exports 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/3 As immediately above.  
12 
2015/13 Zaman, Khilji  The growth–
inequality–poverty 
triangle  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/9 As immediately above.  
13 
2015/13 Salar, 
Zaman, Khilji 
Consequences of 
revenue gap  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/1 As immediately above.  
14 
2015/13 Mudakkar, 
Uppal, 
Zaman, 
Naseem, 
Shah 
Foreign exchange risk 
in a managed float 
regime 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/0 As immediately above.  
15 
2015/13 Rustam, 
Rashid, 
Zaman 
Audit committees, 
compensation 
incentives & corporate 
audit fees  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/10 As immediately above.  
16 
2015/12 Zaman, 
Khan, Ahmad 
Foreign direct 
investment & pro-poor 
growth policies  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/17 As immediately above. 
17 
2015/12 Hassan, 
Zaman 
Effect of oil prices on 
trade balance  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/17 As immediately above.  
18 
2015/12 Zaman, 
Izhar, Khan, 
Ahmad 
Financial indicators & 
human development  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.827/Q2/1
5 
As immediately above.  
19 
2015/12 Zaman, 
Khan, 
Ahmad, Khilji 
Agricultural 
technologies & carbon 
emissions  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/13 As immediately above.  
20 
2015/12 Naz, Mohsin, 
Zaman 
Exchange rate pass-
through in to inflation 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/12 As immediately above.  
21 
2015/12 Moshin, 
Zaman 
Distributional effects 
of rising food prices  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/4 As immediately above.  
22 
2014/14 Li, Shi Multidimensional 
BSDEs with uniformly 
continuous 
coefficients 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2/0.59/Q2/0 No Reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author(s) 
and/or editor." 
23 
2014/13 Gerasimou Equivalence of 
continuity & 
hemicontinuity for 
preference preorders 
J. 
Mathematical 
Econ. 
3/0.74/Q2/0 As immediately above.  
24 
2014/09 Maniar, 
Bhatt, 
Maniyar 
Expiration hour effect 
of futures & options 
markets  
Int. Rev. 
Econ. & Fin. 
2/1.70/Q1/12 Plagiarism: “This article has been retracted at the request of the Editor. The 
authors have plagiarized part of a paper that had already appeared.” 
25 2014/07 Zhang, Da, Nonlinear duopoly Econ. 2/0.83/Q2/81 Plagiarism: "This paper has been removed on the grounds of plagiarism. This 
36  
Wang  game with 
heterogeneous players 
Modelling case was investigated by the RePEc plagiarism committee and plagiarism was 
confirmed."  
26 
2013/13 Barczyk Kolodko, truth, errors, 
& lies  
Econ. 
Systems 
2/0.65/Q2/0 As immediately above. 
27 
2013/11 Shin, Hwang Examining the factors 
affecting the rate of 
IPTV diffusion 
J. Media 
Econ. 
1/0.42/Q2/7 Self-plagiarism: “… data reported in this article was reproduced identically from 
data published in the following articles authored or co-authored by Prof. Shin of 
Sungkyun kwan University, South Korea …” 
28 
2013/10 Baek, Park Convergence of 
weighted sums for 
arrays of negatively 
dependent random 
variables  
J. Stat. 
Planning & 
Inference 
2/0.67/Q2/11 Multiple submissions: "The article is a duplicate of a paper … already … 
published in the J. Theoretical Prob. (2010), 23: 362-377. One of the conditions 
of submission … is that authors declare explicitly that the paper is not under 
consideration for publication elsewhere … this was not detected during the 
submission process. As a sanction, J. Theoretical Probability will not allow the 
authors … to participate in the journal in any way until Jan. 1, 2018." 
29 
2012/12 Rosoi Financial integration 
& international 
transmission of 
business cycles 
Applied 
Econ. Letters 
1/0.30/Q3/0 Plagiarism: "This article substantially reproduced the content of … Fidrmuc, 
Iwatsubo and Ikeda, Financial integration and international transmission of 
business cycles … Discussion Papers 1007, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe 
University, 2010." 
30 
2012/12 Fei, Liu Stochastic set 
differential equations  
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2/0.59/Q2/0 As immediately above.  
31 
2012/12 Batabyal, 
Nijkamp 
A Schumpeterian 
model of 
entrepreneurship, 
innovation, & regional 
economic growth 
Int. Regional 
Science Rev. 
2/1.18/N/18 No Reason 
32 
2012/11 Zulkhibri Corporate financing 
choices & monetary 
policy  
Econ. 
Systems 
2/0.65/Q2/0 No Reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the editor." 
33 
2011/11 Cheng, 
Zhang  
Pricing American 
options analytically 
J. Econ. 
Dynamics & 
Control 
3/1.02/Q2/2 As immediately above. 
34 
2011/10 Lau More powerful non-
linear panel unit root 
test & its application 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2/0.83/Q2/0 No Reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author(s) 
and/or editor.” 
35 
2010/10 Gervini Functional singular 
value decomposition 
for bivariate stochastic 
processes 
Computation
al Stats & 
Data Anal. 
3/1.4/Q1/0 Multiple submissions: "This article was submitted on Jan 26, 2009 to 
Computational Stats & Data Anal. (CSDA) and … was submitted on Jan 27, 
2009 to J. Multivariate Anal. (JMVA). The paper was rejected by JMVA and after 
two revisions it was accepted by CSDA in July 2009. On November 17, 2009, the 
Editor-in-Chief was notified … that … the paper was submitted to two journals 
around the same time … the author indicated that he [did so] to ensure prompt 
publication. One of the conditions of submission … is that authors declare 
explicitly that the paper is not under consideration for publication elsewhere … 
this article represents a severe abuse of the scientific publishing system." 
36 
2010/09 Mehrara Effects of oil price 
shocks on industrial 
production 
Energy Econ. 3/2.71/Q1/0 No reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author." 
37  
37 
2010/09 Chong, 
Guillen, 
Lopez‐de‐
Silanes 
Corporate governance 
reform & firm value in 
Mexico 
J. Econ. 
Policy Reform 
2/0.86/Q2/22 Self-plagiarism: "This article substantially reproduced the content of a book 
chapter edited by Chong and Lopez‐de‐Silanes. Corporate Governance and Firm 
Value in Mexico … published in … a co‐publication of Stanford University Press, 
the World Bank and the Inter‐American Development Bank … in 2007." 
38 
2010/08 Hahn Convergence of 
fictitious play in 
games with strategic 
complementarities 
Econ. Letters 3/0.51/Q2/5 Flawed reasoning/analysis: "Because of an error discovered by Berger, Hahn is 
retracting his letter. The paper claims to prove that a strategy-adjustment 
process called ‘fictitious play’ converges to an equilibrium in games with 
strategic complementarities. However, as shown by Berger, the proof of 
convergence is flawed." 
39 
2009/09 Wei, Li Ecological value at 
risk 
Ecological 
Econ. 
3/2.72/Q1/4 No reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author(s) 
and/or editor." 
40 
2009/09 Noailly,  
Nahuis 
Entry & competition in 
the Dutch notary 
profession 
Int. Rev. Law 
& Econ. 
2/0.34/Q2/0 No reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the editor." 
41 
2009/09 Wagner Legal uncertainty  Int. Rev. Law 
& Econ. 
2/0.34/Q2/0 No reason: "This article has been withdrawn consistent with Elsevier Policy on 
Article Withdrawal (http://www.elsevier.com/locate/withdrawalpolicy).” 
42 
2009/07 Nofsinger Social mood J. Behavioral 
& 
Experimental 
Econ. 
(formerly J. 
Socio-Econ.) 
2/0.34/Q2/14 Plagiarism: "Dr. Nofsinger's version derived its thesis and substantially its 
content from a pre-existing discussion paper by Prechter, Goel and Parker that 
he reviewed prior to producing his iteration. Contrary to the publisher's policy on 
originality and plagiarism, Dr. Nofsinger's submission failed to cite the earlier 
work. Dr. Nofsinger has agreed to retract his paper." 
43 
2008/08 Djankov A response to “Is doing 
business damaging 
business?” 
J. 
Comparative 
Econ. 
3/1.17/Q2/22 No reason: "This article has been withdrawn consistent with Elsevier Policy on 
Article Withdrawal" 
44 
2008/08 Fukuyama, 
Neupane 
Convergence of 
weighted averages of 
pairwise independent 
random variables 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2/0.59/Q2/0 As immediately above. 
45 
2008/07 Said, 
Wegman, 
Sharabati, 
Rigsby  
Social networks of 
author–co-author 
relationships 
Computation
al Stats & 
Data Anal. 
3/1.4/Q1/62 Plagiarism: "This article … contain[s] portions of other authors' writings on the 
same topic in other publications, without sufficient attribution ... The principal 
authors … acknowledged that text from background sources was mistakenly 
used in the Introduction without proper reference to the original source." 
46 
2007/02 Kunce, 
Gerking, 
Morgan 
Effects of 
environmental & land 
use regulation in the 
oil & gas industry  
American 
Econ. Rev. 
4*/3.67/Q1/5 Incorrect conclusion: "Findings presented in the original paper cannot be 
substantiated because the data furnished by IHS Energy Group cannot be used 
to identify differences between drilling costs on lands under different ownership." 
47 
2007/07 Ullrich Inflation expectations 
of experts & ECB 
communication 
North 
American J. 
Econ. & Fin. 
2/N/Q2/0 No reason: "This article has been withdrawn consistent with Elsevier Policy on 
Article Withdrawal." 
48 
2007/07 Meintanis  Exponentiality against 
non-parametric family 
of life distributions 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2/0.595/Q2/0 As immediately above.  
49 
2007/07 Lanconelli Mehler's formula & 
Jensen's inequality  
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2/0.59/Q2/0 As immediately above.  
38  
50 
2005/05 Cooter, Raja, 
Schäfer 
Intro to workshop on 
law & econ. devp.  
Int. Rev. Law 
& Econ. 
2/0.34/Q2/0 As immediately above.  
51 
2005/05 Meerschaert  Norming operators for 
generalized domains of 
attraction 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2/0.59/Q2/0 No reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author(s) 
and/or editor." 
52 
2005/04 Pingyan, 
Shixin  
Complete convergence 
for arrays 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2/0.59/Q2/0 As immediately above. 
53 
2004/04 Sheena On unbiasedness of 
invariant tests of 
sphericity 
J. 
Multivariate 
Anal. 
3/0.93/Q1/0 As immediately above. 
54 
2001/01 Furstenberg, 
Kaga  
Linear regression & 
second moments 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2/0.59/Q2/0 As immediately above. 
55 
1982/81 Nath, Enns  Optimal service rates 
in the multiserver loss 
system  
J. Applied 
Prob. 
2/0.59/Q2/6 Plagiarism: "... This paper is almost identical in form and content to that 
published by Tahara and Nishida … in the J. of the Operations Research Society 
of Japan, 18, 1975, 90-96." 
 
